http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20091124-237995/Grinding-scammers-down
By Juan Mercado
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: November 24, 2009
“Example is the school of mankind,” parliamentarian Edmund Burke wrote. “They will learn from no other.”
Solita Collas-Monsod’s columns in the Philippine Daily Inquirer document how the Arroyo regime embeds scams that ousted President Ferdinand Marcos and tycoon Lucio Tan cobbled. They’re examples of first-rate investigative reporting. Journalists and mass communication students have another model to learn from.
Monsod’s work is critically relevant. “We’re moving towards the new impatient culture of a journalism of assertion, rather than verification,” Harvard University’s Bill Kovacs writes. “The new journalism (presses) to go on with the story before going through the discipline of editing.”
“Journalism of unfiltered assertion” is the alternate model. “It (won’t) separate fact from spin, argument from innuendo. It exacts too high a cost from society … ruthless respect for facts remains journalism’s most enduring strength.”
The Inquirer published Monsod’s columns—“Tortured claims” to “Overpowering stench”—from October through early November this year. They probe into the P51-billion Sandiganbayan Civil Case 005. The meticulous research display “ruthless respect for facts.”
Tan wrote Marcos to wangle a P310 million standby letter of credit on March 26, 1977. That was “a Saturday,” Monsod wrote with an eye for the telling detail. Monday, Tan had P310 million on hand. The “PNB” single borrower limit then was P200 million. Another damming detail.
The dictator had 60 percent stake in seven Tan’s firms, Imelda Marcos testified. However, “Tan never delivered the shares of stock to FM’s estate in accordance with the deed of assignment.” Did one’s unexplained wealth morph into another’s unanticipated windfall following “People Power”?
The careful authentication reflects journalism’s First Commandment: “Thou shalt check, then recheck, your facts.” Thanks to Monsod, one now understands Imelda’s choice of epithets. “That beer bottle-peddler,” she once dubbed Tan.
The columns go beyond trashing historical carcasses. They reveal that the Arroyo regime cloned the Marcos-Tan corruption. Tuloy ang ligaya. What does such betrayal mean?
At this storm’s center stands Mariano Tanenglian, Tan’s brother who acted as financial consigliere” for decades. “Tanenglian knows where all the bodies are.” He offered to sign in return for immunity, as did earlier other Marcos cronies. Solicitor General Agnes Devanadera and Presidential Commission on Good Government Chair Camilo Sabio rejected the offer.
Devanadera instead cashiered PCGG lawyer Catalino Generillo for painstakingly gathering the evidence. If Tanenglian wants to testify, he shouldn’t set conditions, PCGG’s Ricardo Abcede piously insisted. Earlier, this commissioner was at a loss why the public howled delicadeza when he partied with defendant Imelda.
“Why does Devanadera want to lose the case against Tan?” Monsod wondered. I’d ask the justice secretary first, of course. But, then that’d be Devanadera too.
Reminds one of Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. He was skewered for filing cases rigged to fail. Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez is an “Aniano Desierto in skirts,” critics say. History repeats itself as a farce.
“What will the President (Macapagal-Arroyo) do?” Nothing—except probably appoint Devanadera to a Supreme Court crammed with her appointees. PCGG’s Sabio? He’s busy denying junketing with his family, all over Europe. Who foots the bill?
“You journalists live in the reality-based community,” a senior official told editor Bill Kovacs. “That’s not the way the world works anymore. We create our own reality ....We’re history’s actors.... And you’ll just study what we do.”
“Yet, today’s generation is empowered by technology to instantly tap into wells of information,” Kovacs said at Boston University. “You can challenge history’s actors. To survive you must ask: Is the information verified? ... Help us learn the new role of citizen journalist and gatekeeper of reliable information.”
How many Filipinos are potential citizen journalists?
Worldwide, eight out of every 10 persons on social networks, like “YouTube,” “Twitter “ or “Multiply,” are Filipinos, Jane Paredes of Smart Communications says. And 70.4 million Filipinos heft cellphones.
Will 70.4 million journalists verify facts, Sun Star’s president Jess Garcia asked a Cebu Press Freedom Week seminar. A columnist like Amando Doronila does. Or will we have 70.4 million who merely assert.
Tomorrow’s “citizen journalist” must be the “gatekeeper of reliable information” if new media is to be a force for reform and service. And work by investigative journalists like Monsod, Malou Mangahas of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism or Yvonne Chua of Vera Files, among others, set the parameters for this new tool.
Also, no substitute has yet been found for journalists of integrity. Thus, the late Alan Chalkley of Financial Times would drill into cub reports the pig-Latin motto: Nil Illegitimati Carborundum. “Don’t let the bastards grind you down.”
Thursday
A low point in anti-graft battle
http://www.bworldonline.com/main/content.php?id=1737
Calling A Spade... -- By Solita Collas-Monsod
This has to be one of the lowest points in our nation’s battle against the cancer of graft and corruption. And this time, the Executive takes a back seat to both the Judiciary (in this case, the Supreme Court) and the Legislature (in this case the Senate).
The Supreme Court, it is reported, or at least eight of its members, voted a couple of days ago to include Agnes Devanadera in their shortlist of nominees to the Supreme Court. This is the Devanadera, who, as head of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, signed a compromise agreement between Philippine National Construction Conpany (PNCC) and a company called Radstock. What is so bad about that? The agreement practically gave away, lock, stock, and barrel, the multi-billion-peso assets (around P18 billion) to Radstock, whose only claim to fame is that it bought out the rights of one of PNCC’s creditors for all of $2 million. The case is now with the Supreme Court, because a former president of PNCC, Louie Sison, was so appalled that the Court of Appeals (yes, the one with many bad apples), had actually approved the agreement, that he was compelled to appeal it to the Supreme Court. The case is still pending. Imagine that, dear reader. A compromise agreement that gives a company that "invested" at most P100 million, the rights to an P18-billion company. And Devanadera signed it.
This is the Devanadera who was accused by Mark Jimenez of extorting money from him at his house (presumably for her law mentor/partner Hernani Perez) and as undersecretary of justice under Simeon Datumanong, was said to be "sitting’ on Perez’ case. This is the Devanadera, who as officer-in-charge of the Justice Department (while Raul Gonzales was on sick leave), reversed the decision of her state prosecutor in the Delgado murder case with such haste (he had found no probable cause to charge Luis Q. Gonzalez with murder) that her decision was filled with glaring factual errors -- including when the murder took place, not to mention lousy reasoning. The Court of Appeals, in its decision ordering the information against Gonzalez quashed, found very serious flaws in her legal reasoning. The Supreme Court, in its decision upholding the CA, severely criticized Devanadera’s actuations as solicitor general in the same case.
And finally, this is the same Devanadera, who again as solicitor general, declared (with a straight face at that) that using Mariano Tanenglian as a state witness against his brother Lucio Tan would be disadvantageous to the government (!!) in the prosecution of its case against Lucio. Mariano, in case anyone still doesn’t know, was treasurer and director of all Lucio’s corporations, being with him from the start. Mariano and Lucio were as thick as thieves until a very bitter, and irreconcileable falling out between the brothers. Mariano offered to tell all -- and Devanadera has blocked him from doing so.
Good grief.
This is the woman that eight justices of the Supreme Court want to sit on the bench with them? Any one of the above incidents would suffice to cast a huge cloud of doubt on either her integrity, or her competence, or both. Which should automatically disqualify her, borrowing from the precautionary principle. What is more, if they all of a sudden have remembered that they need a lady justice (none of the new appointees are women) there are at least two women Court of Appeals justices that have both integrity and competence in spades -- whose names have never been bruited about practitioners of transactional justice, and whose judicial excellence has been publicly recognized and unquestioned: CA Justices Josefina G. Salonga and Portia A. Hormachuelos. Why not them? Is it because they have no political backers? Or is it because they do not lobby (shamelessly) with the SC justices for the position?
Please, Judicial and Bar Council. We need candidates whose appointments will bring honor, and not shame, to their respective positions.
As for the Legislature -- or rather, the Senate. The Senate Committee of the Whole, which means the entire Senate, had been investigating an ethics complaint against Manny Villar in connection with certain road projects. Villar himself has refused to participate in the hearings, just as he refused to participate in the Ethics Committee hearings (which is why the Ethics Committee recommended that the hearings be handled by the Committee of the Whole in the first place). Having called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court composed of presidential hopefuls who had their knives out for him, he then called the entire Senate a bigger kangaroo court. The members of his block, called the Minority Block (Joker Arroyo, the two Cayetanos, J, Kiko Pangilinan, Nene Pimentel, and Villar himself) also refused to participate.
Questions present themselves, and the first should be asked of Villar: How come, while he was Senate president, he did not consider the Senate as a kangaroo court-type body? What happened, other than the fact that he was thrown out as Senate president, to change the character of its members? Could it have been that presidential hopefuls from among the senators, numbering seven (aside from Villar) of the 23 members -- Aquino, Escudero, Gordon, Lacson, Legarda, Madrigal, and Roxas -- had their knives out for him? But why not for each other as well?
But that would account for only seven of the senators. What does that make of the other 15 senators? Mindless automatons at the beck and call of these presidential wannabes? What an indictment of the Senate.
In any case, the Committee of the Whole finished its hearings, and its report was being drafted, when out comes Senate P.S. Res. No. 1472 "expressing the sense of the Senate to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the complaint against Senator Manuel B. Villar and clear as it hereby clears him of alleged acts of disorderly behavor."
Just like that. Without even waiting for the draft report of the Committee of the Whole to come out.
Why not? Because, it would seem from the Proposed Senate Resolution, the signatories had already weighed the evidence and come to their conclusion, far ahead of the counsels and staff of the Committee as a Whole.
And who were these signatories? Well, of course you have the Minority Block, who did not even bother to attend the hearings -- including, you guessed it, Villar himself, who essentially judged himself and found himself innocent. That’s six. And then the other six were Loren Legarda, who is now Villar’s running mate, Ramon Revilla Jr, Lito Lapid, Gringo Honasan , Jinggoy Estrada (who is running in Villar’s ticket), and Mirian Santiago.
But now another question: Does this mean that the Senate is no longer a kangaroo court, as Villar charged it to be? If the answer is yes, then a follow-up question: What changed the character of the senators this time around?
That this resolution, so premature, so defiant of basic rules of conduct, so obviously timed to try to take the sails out of the report of the Committee of the Whole (making it moot and academic) has been referred to the Senate Committee on Rules is immaterial. The picture we get is of a Senate where members can defy the body as a whole and get a way with it, where graft charges can be whitewashed by a simple resolution, where justice is a matter of transaction -- of convenience, even -- rather than a matter of law.
And these are our representatives? And these are our servants? God help us.
Calling A Spade... -- By Solita Collas-Monsod
This has to be one of the lowest points in our nation’s battle against the cancer of graft and corruption. And this time, the Executive takes a back seat to both the Judiciary (in this case, the Supreme Court) and the Legislature (in this case the Senate).
The Supreme Court, it is reported, or at least eight of its members, voted a couple of days ago to include Agnes Devanadera in their shortlist of nominees to the Supreme Court. This is the Devanadera, who, as head of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, signed a compromise agreement between Philippine National Construction Conpany (PNCC) and a company called Radstock. What is so bad about that? The agreement practically gave away, lock, stock, and barrel, the multi-billion-peso assets (around P18 billion) to Radstock, whose only claim to fame is that it bought out the rights of one of PNCC’s creditors for all of $2 million. The case is now with the Supreme Court, because a former president of PNCC, Louie Sison, was so appalled that the Court of Appeals (yes, the one with many bad apples), had actually approved the agreement, that he was compelled to appeal it to the Supreme Court. The case is still pending. Imagine that, dear reader. A compromise agreement that gives a company that "invested" at most P100 million, the rights to an P18-billion company. And Devanadera signed it.
This is the Devanadera who was accused by Mark Jimenez of extorting money from him at his house (presumably for her law mentor/partner Hernani Perez) and as undersecretary of justice under Simeon Datumanong, was said to be "sitting’ on Perez’ case. This is the Devanadera, who as officer-in-charge of the Justice Department (while Raul Gonzales was on sick leave), reversed the decision of her state prosecutor in the Delgado murder case with such haste (he had found no probable cause to charge Luis Q. Gonzalez with murder) that her decision was filled with glaring factual errors -- including when the murder took place, not to mention lousy reasoning. The Court of Appeals, in its decision ordering the information against Gonzalez quashed, found very serious flaws in her legal reasoning. The Supreme Court, in its decision upholding the CA, severely criticized Devanadera’s actuations as solicitor general in the same case.
And finally, this is the same Devanadera, who again as solicitor general, declared (with a straight face at that) that using Mariano Tanenglian as a state witness against his brother Lucio Tan would be disadvantageous to the government (!!) in the prosecution of its case against Lucio. Mariano, in case anyone still doesn’t know, was treasurer and director of all Lucio’s corporations, being with him from the start. Mariano and Lucio were as thick as thieves until a very bitter, and irreconcileable falling out between the brothers. Mariano offered to tell all -- and Devanadera has blocked him from doing so.
Good grief.
This is the woman that eight justices of the Supreme Court want to sit on the bench with them? Any one of the above incidents would suffice to cast a huge cloud of doubt on either her integrity, or her competence, or both. Which should automatically disqualify her, borrowing from the precautionary principle. What is more, if they all of a sudden have remembered that they need a lady justice (none of the new appointees are women) there are at least two women Court of Appeals justices that have both integrity and competence in spades -- whose names have never been bruited about practitioners of transactional justice, and whose judicial excellence has been publicly recognized and unquestioned: CA Justices Josefina G. Salonga and Portia A. Hormachuelos. Why not them? Is it because they have no political backers? Or is it because they do not lobby (shamelessly) with the SC justices for the position?
Please, Judicial and Bar Council. We need candidates whose appointments will bring honor, and not shame, to their respective positions.
As for the Legislature -- or rather, the Senate. The Senate Committee of the Whole, which means the entire Senate, had been investigating an ethics complaint against Manny Villar in connection with certain road projects. Villar himself has refused to participate in the hearings, just as he refused to participate in the Ethics Committee hearings (which is why the Ethics Committee recommended that the hearings be handled by the Committee of the Whole in the first place). Having called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court composed of presidential hopefuls who had their knives out for him, he then called the entire Senate a bigger kangaroo court. The members of his block, called the Minority Block (Joker Arroyo, the two Cayetanos, J, Kiko Pangilinan, Nene Pimentel, and Villar himself) also refused to participate.
Questions present themselves, and the first should be asked of Villar: How come, while he was Senate president, he did not consider the Senate as a kangaroo court-type body? What happened, other than the fact that he was thrown out as Senate president, to change the character of its members? Could it have been that presidential hopefuls from among the senators, numbering seven (aside from Villar) of the 23 members -- Aquino, Escudero, Gordon, Lacson, Legarda, Madrigal, and Roxas -- had their knives out for him? But why not for each other as well?
But that would account for only seven of the senators. What does that make of the other 15 senators? Mindless automatons at the beck and call of these presidential wannabes? What an indictment of the Senate.
In any case, the Committee of the Whole finished its hearings, and its report was being drafted, when out comes Senate P.S. Res. No. 1472 "expressing the sense of the Senate to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the complaint against Senator Manuel B. Villar and clear as it hereby clears him of alleged acts of disorderly behavor."
Just like that. Without even waiting for the draft report of the Committee of the Whole to come out.
Why not? Because, it would seem from the Proposed Senate Resolution, the signatories had already weighed the evidence and come to their conclusion, far ahead of the counsels and staff of the Committee as a Whole.
And who were these signatories? Well, of course you have the Minority Block, who did not even bother to attend the hearings -- including, you guessed it, Villar himself, who essentially judged himself and found himself innocent. That’s six. And then the other six were Loren Legarda, who is now Villar’s running mate, Ramon Revilla Jr, Lito Lapid, Gringo Honasan , Jinggoy Estrada (who is running in Villar’s ticket), and Mirian Santiago.
But now another question: Does this mean that the Senate is no longer a kangaroo court, as Villar charged it to be? If the answer is yes, then a follow-up question: What changed the character of the senators this time around?
That this resolution, so premature, so defiant of basic rules of conduct, so obviously timed to try to take the sails out of the report of the Committee of the Whole (making it moot and academic) has been referred to the Senate Committee on Rules is immaterial. The picture we get is of a Senate where members can defy the body as a whole and get a way with it, where graft charges can be whitewashed by a simple resolution, where justice is a matter of transaction -- of convenience, even -- rather than a matter of law.
And these are our representatives? And these are our servants? God help us.
Friday
Marcos financial adviser backs Imelda’s claim
http://services.inquirer.net/print/print.php?article_id=20091113-236086
By Solita Collas-Monsod
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: November 13, 2009
By Solita Collas-Monsod
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: November 13, 2009
ROLANDO C. GAPUD HAD THIS TO SAY about the Ferdinand Marcos-Lucio Tan relationship:
“8. With particular reference, for example, to Mr. Lucio Tan, I know that Mr. Marcos and Mr. Lucio Tan had an understanding that Mr. Marcos owns 60% of Shareholdings, Inc., which owns shares of Fortrune Tobacco, Asia Beer Brewery, Allied Bank and Foremost Farms. I was asked sometime in 1985 to formalize this arrangement. I went to Mr. Lucio Tan for that purpose. He tried to bargain by reducing the equity of Mr. Marcos to 50%. I told him that I was merely carrying out the instruction of Mr. Marcos and that if he wanted to bargain, he should take up the matter directly with Mr. Marcos. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lucio Tan, apart from the 60% equity of Mr. Marcos, had been regularly paying through Security Bank, Sixty Million Pesos (P60 million) to One Hundred Million Pesos (P100 million) a year to Mr. Marcos in exchange for privileges and concessions Mr. Marcos had been giving him in relation to the businesses managed by Mr. Lucio Tan. As I said on p.7 of Annex “A,” Mr. Lucio Tan gained substantial concessions in specific taxes and stamp duties for his cigarette (Fortune Tobacco) and beer (Asia Brewery) operations. He belongs to the group that could get presidential decrees and letters of instruction from Mr. Marcos for their joint benefit. I understand that Mr. Tan asserted that he was the victim of extortion, and that he outwitted Mr. Marcos by issuing to Mr. Marcos his 60% equity in fake certificates of stock. This is not accurate. Mr. Marcos and Mr. Tan were in partnership, and they derived great material benefits from that relationship. As far as I know, Mr. Tan was not in a position to outwit and outmaneuver Mr. Marcos. I do not know that there is a crony or business associate of Mr. Marcos who could have done that.”
So there you have testimony that supports Imelda Marcos’ claim that Marcos owned 60 percent of the Lucio Tan enterprises—from the fellow who “formalized” the arrangement. Note that Gapud says Tan is a liar—well, no, he doesn’t. He says that what Tan said about his outwitting Marcos is “not accurate.” Which is the same thing.
But who is Rolando C. Gapud? Those under 45 years of age will most probably not know him, because he and his family fled the country (through the back door) over 25 years ago (in June 1986). But I do. He was one of Sixto K. Roxas’ fair-haired boys, rising to senior vice president and chief operating officer of Bancom (an investment bank) when it was in its heyday and Roxas was considered an economic and financial wizard. If memory serves, his professional rival for the post was Luis Villafuerte (yes, Virginia, the present congressman), but Gapud got it.
And he deserved it. He did his graduate work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Alfred P. Sloan School of Management), earning a master’s of science in industrial management, during which he co-authored a paper entitled “A Measure of Information System Efficiency,” which one can still access from the MIT library.
But more to the point, while at Bancom he became the favorite financial consultant of Jose Yao Campos of Unilab, and it was Campos who introduced him to Ferdinand Marcos, who was similarly impressed (he now does work for Campos’ son, Joselito, although apparently he now is based in Hong Kong).
The paragraph quoted above is from Gapud’s statement, executed in Hong Kong in January 1987, in the presence of then PCGG Chair Jovito Salonga, as well as Gapud’s lawyer, Angel Cruz. It was introduced as evidence in the Sandiganbayan only when Catalino Generillo took over the PCGG case (over the objections of Tan’s lawyers), with Salonga testifying to its authenticity (his signature is also included).
In other words, Gapud cooperated willingly with the government. In his statement, he described himself as Marcos’ financial executor—although he was consulted now and again by Marcos, his main role was following Marcos’ orders, as relayed to him either directly by Marcos, or through Fe Gimenez. It is my understanding that Gapud’s knowledge about the Marcos’ ownership arrangements with Ramon Cojuangco and PLDT was crucial in the Philippine government’s success in recovering those shares.
Unfortunately, Gapud was never deposed in Civil Case 005 against Imelda Marcos, Lucio Tan, et al. Why not? Well, way back in the early 1990s, the PCGG asked to have him deposed, but was denied permission by the Sandiganbayan (because the defendants had as yet not filed all their answers). It went all the way up to the Supreme Court, which, in 2001, upheld the Sandiganbayan. The SC decision, penned by Justice Reynato Puno, with then Chief Justice Hilario Davide and Justices Bernardo Pardo and Consuelo Ynares Santiago concurring, states in its penultimate statement: “Finally, the Court notes that petitioner [PCGG] waited all these years for a ruling on this case instead of working for the rest of the defendants to be summoned and their answers to be filed. Petitioner can, as a matter of course, take Mr. Gapud’s deposition after the individual defendants have at least filed their answers.”
So, when all the defendants’ answers were in, did the PCGG take Gapud’s deposition? NO. It turned a deaf ear to Generillo’s urgent requests to have him deposed.
The present PCGG has done zilch, and then has the absolute gall to say it has a weak case!
Thursday
Calling a Spade - Conclusion
http://bworld.com.ph/main/content.php?id=1317
Calling A Spade... -- By Solita Collas-Monsod
Conclusion
I asked Catalino Generillo where he obtained the documentary evidence of the links between Lucio Tan and Ferdinand Marcos. Generillo was the PCGG lawyer hired by Haydee Yorac way back in 2001, who in 2007 was assigned to handle PCGG’s long-running Civil Case 005 (filed in 1987, reached trial stage in 2006), which seeks to show that Marcos was (majority) owner of Lucio Tan’s enterprises.
In 1998, Imelda Marcos filed a manifestation in which she admitted that her husband owned 60% of the Tan empire, and in 2001, she filed a cross complaint against her co-defendant Lucio Tan because of his refusal to hand over the shares of stock for which she held the deeds of assignment. The wonder of it is that the PCGG did not immediately take advantage of these developments, and it was only when Generillo took over the case that things started to pop. For his excellent performance, PCGG, at the request of the OSG, terminated his employment. The second wonder of it is that our legislature, which generally calls for investigations at the drop of a hat, has remained mute, with not one opinion being given on the case, one way or another.
Generillo’s reply was that the documents were subpoenaed from the BSP and from the Malacañang Museum at his request, which makes one ponder on why these very rich sources of evidence were not tapped by the PCGG before Generillo came on the scene.
Last week’s column reprinted a couple of these documents, circa 1977, which leads one to the inevitable conclusion that it was Marcos’s intervention with the PNB and what was known as the Central Bank of the Philippines (now BSP) that enabled Tan to acquire what is now known as the Allied Banking Corporation.
In this concluding portion, I reprint two other documents, this time dated seven and five years later (the relationship Marcos-Tan relationship obviously was of long standing): the first shows how Marcos intervened once again to save Allied Bank from its foreign creditors at the height of the country’s debt crisis in 1984; and the second, dated 1982, shows that Marcos helped Tan in his other enterprises as well. Given such evidence, a third wonder appears: Why does the PCGG proclaim that its case against Tan as a dummy for Marcos is weak?
"ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION
"May 9, 1984
"His Excellency Ferdinand E Marcos
"President, Republic of the Philippines
"Malacanang Palace, Manila
"Dear Mr. President:
"We wish to inform you that the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) has been and continues to be an active supporter of loan syndications for our Central Bank and the different instrumentalities of the Government of the Philippines.
"Among such syndicated loan participations are
"To fund the above loans, ABC had successfully borrowed from the Eurdollar centers, particularly from the Middle East market through ABAC’s Bahrain Branch. ABC’s borrowing capability from these markets was greatly impaired by the moratorium declared by our Government, to the extent that collection suits have been threatened and initiated by some Middle East and European banks against ABC. A particular collection suit even resulted in the actual seizure of ABC’s foreign funds in New York by way of an order of attachment.
"To this day, these banks continue with their threats and demands for immediate repayment of the principal, interest and penalties.
"Sheikh Ebrahim Al Khalifa, Deputy Governor of the Bahrain Monetary Agency, had to make a visit to our country on March 12, 1984, for the sole purpose of seeking a solution to this debt problem. He impressed upon Prime Minister Cesar Virata, Trade Minister Roberto Ongpin, and CB Governor Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. that these Middle East and European Banks are not willing to maintain their deposits with ABC Bahrein, contending that these are interbank placements which should not be covered by the moratorium.
"Sheikh Khalifa added that since the Gulf States are a well-knit group, he fears that this unresolved banking issue may have a repercussion on the Philippine market for manpower exports to the Middle East, which is now a major source of vital foreign exchange.
"ABC’s predicament is unique in the local banking industry, since only ABC has actively participated in the Government’s foreign borrowing program. A request by ABC for a prepayhment of its lendings to the Government will surely jeopardize the rescheduling process, as this will give undue preference to ABC to the detriment of other syndicate lenders.
"Thus, it is respectfully requested that the Central Bank make deposits to ABC, in an amount equivalent to the above listed loans, which ABC shall use to pay its Middle Eastern and European creditors. To the extent that Central Bank will be unable to deposit the total amount required, it is respectfully requested that the uncovered balance be considered eligible as reserves against deposit liabilities under Section 1254 (b) of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries, on the princple that the promissory notes evidencying ABC’s lendings to these various government instrumentalities are obligations of the Government and therefore should be treated as government securities.
"We trust that His Excellency will find the foregoing request in order and will extend to it his favorable consideration.
"(sgd) ROMEO Y. CO
"President
"(sgd)MARIANO TANENGLIAN
"Treasurer & Director"
The letter has a marginal note at the upper right hand corner, in the handwriting and with the signature of Ferdinand Marcos which says:
It would be interesting to find out if Jobo did acquiesce, but at this time that is actually beside the point. What is important is that Marcos was asked by ABC to intervene to save it, even though this intervention could put the Central Bank, and even the Philippines, at risk -- and Marcos did.
Now for the next letter:
"ASIA BREWERY Incorporated
"January 11, 1982
"Minister Roberto V. Ongpin
"The Board of Investments
"Buendia Avenue Extension
"Makati, Metro Manila
"Sir:
"This refers to our letter dated Jan. 4, 1982, addressed to His Excellency President Ferdinand E. Marcos requesting for a duty and tax free importation of 100 million Pcs. Glass bottles. We were advised that His Excellency has endorsed this matter to your good office for appropriate action.
"In line with the government’s policy in restricting the flow of dollars out of the country, we are amenable to reducing our request to import 60 million pcs. Glass bottles instead of the 100 million pcs. And that this importantion will ;not exceed the amount of Australian Dollars -- 6.0 million. We would, however, appreciate your immediate action on our said request as we need said bottles urgently in order to meet the demand of our new beer product in the market. Although the 60 million pcs. may not be sufficient to last up to the time when our glass bottling plant will be in full production, we are willing to cooperate with our government’s economic policies.
"We wish to assure you that this will be the last time for us to make such a request because our own glass-making plant will be in full operation by April this year. By that time, we will not only stop importation, but go into the exportation of glass bottle and beer products as well.
"(sgd) LUCIO C. TAN
"Chairman of the Board"
Again, a note on the upper right-hand corner of the letter, handwritten and signed by Marcos:
"12 Jan 1982
"To Gov Laya and Com. Farolan,
"I believe we can approve
"the request so that we can
"keep our policy credible --
"FEMarcos"
Nota bene: (1) Although the letter is written by Lucio Tan to Roberto V. Ongpin as BOI chair, it has Marcos’s marginal note on it addressed to CB Governor Jaime Laya, and presumably Commissioner of Customs Ramon Farolan. Which suggests that Tan, impatient of Ongpin’s inaction (note that the letter refers to an earlier Jan. 4 letter to Marcos that the latter endorsed to Ongpin), went to Marcos again and asked for a more direct intervention. Which request Marcos complied with. (2) Reading between the lines, it looks like Ongpin balked at granting tax and duty-free importation of 100 million glass bottles, which is why Tan brought it down to 60 million. (3) Per the letter, this is not the only time Tan asked for the tax and duty-free exemptions, but he was assuring that it would be the last time. And (4) Clearly Tan was using his direct line to Ferdinand Marcos with impunity.
With these two documents, one repeats the questions: Does anyone think Ferdinand Marcos favored Tan to this humongous extent for any other reason than that he considered Tan his dummy? Does the PCGG really think that the case against Tan -- with Imelda admitting the relationship -- is weak? If your answer to both questions is yes, please tell me immediately -- there’s a bridge in Brooklyn that is for sale.
Calling A Spade... -- By Solita Collas-Monsod
Conclusion
I asked Catalino Generillo where he obtained the documentary evidence of the links between Lucio Tan and Ferdinand Marcos. Generillo was the PCGG lawyer hired by Haydee Yorac way back in 2001, who in 2007 was assigned to handle PCGG’s long-running Civil Case 005 (filed in 1987, reached trial stage in 2006), which seeks to show that Marcos was (majority) owner of Lucio Tan’s enterprises.
In 1998, Imelda Marcos filed a manifestation in which she admitted that her husband owned 60% of the Tan empire, and in 2001, she filed a cross complaint against her co-defendant Lucio Tan because of his refusal to hand over the shares of stock for which she held the deeds of assignment. The wonder of it is that the PCGG did not immediately take advantage of these developments, and it was only when Generillo took over the case that things started to pop. For his excellent performance, PCGG, at the request of the OSG, terminated his employment. The second wonder of it is that our legislature, which generally calls for investigations at the drop of a hat, has remained mute, with not one opinion being given on the case, one way or another.
Generillo’s reply was that the documents were subpoenaed from the BSP and from the Malacañang Museum at his request, which makes one ponder on why these very rich sources of evidence were not tapped by the PCGG before Generillo came on the scene.
Last week’s column reprinted a couple of these documents, circa 1977, which leads one to the inevitable conclusion that it was Marcos’s intervention with the PNB and what was known as the Central Bank of the Philippines (now BSP) that enabled Tan to acquire what is now known as the Allied Banking Corporation.
In this concluding portion, I reprint two other documents, this time dated seven and five years later (the relationship Marcos-Tan relationship obviously was of long standing): the first shows how Marcos intervened once again to save Allied Bank from its foreign creditors at the height of the country’s debt crisis in 1984; and the second, dated 1982, shows that Marcos helped Tan in his other enterprises as well. Given such evidence, a third wonder appears: Why does the PCGG proclaim that its case against Tan as a dummy for Marcos is weak?
"ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION
"May 9, 1984
"His Excellency Ferdinand E Marcos
"President, Republic of the Philippines
"Malacanang Palace, Manila
"Dear Mr. President:
"We wish to inform you that the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) has been and continues to be an active supporter of loan syndications for our Central Bank and the different instrumentalities of the Government of the Philippines.
"Among such syndicated loan participations are
"To fund the above loans, ABC had successfully borrowed from the Eurdollar centers, particularly from the Middle East market through ABAC’s Bahrain Branch. ABC’s borrowing capability from these markets was greatly impaired by the moratorium declared by our Government, to the extent that collection suits have been threatened and initiated by some Middle East and European banks against ABC. A particular collection suit even resulted in the actual seizure of ABC’s foreign funds in New York by way of an order of attachment.
"To this day, these banks continue with their threats and demands for immediate repayment of the principal, interest and penalties.
"Sheikh Ebrahim Al Khalifa, Deputy Governor of the Bahrain Monetary Agency, had to make a visit to our country on March 12, 1984, for the sole purpose of seeking a solution to this debt problem. He impressed upon Prime Minister Cesar Virata, Trade Minister Roberto Ongpin, and CB Governor Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. that these Middle East and European Banks are not willing to maintain their deposits with ABC Bahrein, contending that these are interbank placements which should not be covered by the moratorium.
"Sheikh Khalifa added that since the Gulf States are a well-knit group, he fears that this unresolved banking issue may have a repercussion on the Philippine market for manpower exports to the Middle East, which is now a major source of vital foreign exchange.
"ABC’s predicament is unique in the local banking industry, since only ABC has actively participated in the Government’s foreign borrowing program. A request by ABC for a prepayhment of its lendings to the Government will surely jeopardize the rescheduling process, as this will give undue preference to ABC to the detriment of other syndicate lenders.
"Thus, it is respectfully requested that the Central Bank make deposits to ABC, in an amount equivalent to the above listed loans, which ABC shall use to pay its Middle Eastern and European creditors. To the extent that Central Bank will be unable to deposit the total amount required, it is respectfully requested that the uncovered balance be considered eligible as reserves against deposit liabilities under Section 1254 (b) of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries, on the princple that the promissory notes evidencying ABC’s lendings to these various government instrumentalities are obligations of the Government and therefore should be treated as government securities.
"We trust that His Excellency will find the foregoing request in order and will extend to it his favorable consideration.
"(sgd) ROMEO Y. CO
"President
"(sgd)MARIANO TANENGLIAN
"Treasurer & Director"
The letter has a marginal note at the upper right hand corner, in the handwriting and with the signature of Ferdinand Marcos which says:
"May 10,1984
"To Gov. J. Fernandez
"I believe the proposal is acceptable --
"FEMarcos"
I WANT to emphasize the obvious: 1) The government had declared a moratorium on foreign debt payments. Where does an ordinary commercial bank get off writing a letter to the President, bypassing the Central Bank completely, and asking for an accommodation that would be so clearly detrimental to the country, and if discovered, weaken the country’s negotiating position even further? The justification given for the request is patently ridiculous -- that ABC had participated in the syndicated foreign loans to the Philippines for altruistic rather than profit motives. 2) The letter even admits that such intervention would impose a risk to the Philippines ("jeopardize the rescheduling process") and had the chutzpah to suggest how the favored treatment that it might be given could be dissimulated -- which would require, again, CB complicity. 4) The turnaround time between ABC’s request and Marcos’s action is only one day, his marginal note indicating that he was not even bothering to ask CB Governor Jobo Fernandez what the latter thought, but practically ordering him to do it.It would be interesting to find out if Jobo did acquiesce, but at this time that is actually beside the point. What is important is that Marcos was asked by ABC to intervene to save it, even though this intervention could put the Central Bank, and even the Philippines, at risk -- and Marcos did.
Now for the next letter:
"ASIA BREWERY Incorporated
"January 11, 1982
"Minister Roberto V. Ongpin
"The Board of Investments
"Buendia Avenue Extension
"Makati, Metro Manila
"Sir:
"This refers to our letter dated Jan. 4, 1982, addressed to His Excellency President Ferdinand E. Marcos requesting for a duty and tax free importation of 100 million Pcs. Glass bottles. We were advised that His Excellency has endorsed this matter to your good office for appropriate action.
"In line with the government’s policy in restricting the flow of dollars out of the country, we are amenable to reducing our request to import 60 million pcs. Glass bottles instead of the 100 million pcs. And that this importantion will ;not exceed the amount of Australian Dollars -- 6.0 million. We would, however, appreciate your immediate action on our said request as we need said bottles urgently in order to meet the demand of our new beer product in the market. Although the 60 million pcs. may not be sufficient to last up to the time when our glass bottling plant will be in full production, we are willing to cooperate with our government’s economic policies.
"We wish to assure you that this will be the last time for us to make such a request because our own glass-making plant will be in full operation by April this year. By that time, we will not only stop importation, but go into the exportation of glass bottle and beer products as well.
"(sgd) LUCIO C. TAN
"Chairman of the Board"
Again, a note on the upper right-hand corner of the letter, handwritten and signed by Marcos:
"12 Jan 1982
"To Gov Laya and Com. Farolan,
"I believe we can approve
"the request so that we can
"keep our policy credible --
"FEMarcos"
Nota bene: (1) Although the letter is written by Lucio Tan to Roberto V. Ongpin as BOI chair, it has Marcos’s marginal note on it addressed to CB Governor Jaime Laya, and presumably Commissioner of Customs Ramon Farolan. Which suggests that Tan, impatient of Ongpin’s inaction (note that the letter refers to an earlier Jan. 4 letter to Marcos that the latter endorsed to Ongpin), went to Marcos again and asked for a more direct intervention. Which request Marcos complied with. (2) Reading between the lines, it looks like Ongpin balked at granting tax and duty-free importation of 100 million glass bottles, which is why Tan brought it down to 60 million. (3) Per the letter, this is not the only time Tan asked for the tax and duty-free exemptions, but he was assuring that it would be the last time. And (4) Clearly Tan was using his direct line to Ferdinand Marcos with impunity.
With these two documents, one repeats the questions: Does anyone think Ferdinand Marcos favored Tan to this humongous extent for any other reason than that he considered Tan his dummy? Does the PCGG really think that the case against Tan -- with Imelda admitting the relationship -- is weak? If your answer to both questions is yes, please tell me immediately -- there’s a bridge in Brooklyn that is for sale.
Tuesday
How the LT bid for GenBank was won
By Solita Collas-Monsod
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: November 07, 2009
TO ILLUSTRATE THE PROPRIETARY NATURE of Ferdinand Marcos’ (FM) behavior towards Lucio Tan (LT) and his companies, last week’s column cited a letter from LT to FM, asking for the latter’s assistance in the former’s bid to acquire General Bank and Trust Co. (GenBank, now Allied Bank).
The specific assistance requested was for FM to "persuade" the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to commit to issue a P310-million standby letter of credit (L/C) in favor of the Central Bank (CB), to secure the loans and advances made by the CB to GenBank. Sans this commitment letter, the bid would be disqualified.
The request, made on a Saturday (March 26, 1977), was urgent. The deadline for submitting the bids had been set by the CB for Monday (March 28, 1977) at 7 p.m.
FM must have acted immediately, because on Monday, March 28, PNB President P.O. Domingo did sign a letter, signifying the bank’s readiness to issue, "at the request of LT" et al., the required standby L/C to the tune of P310 million. This, even though the PNB’s single-borrower limit was only P200 million.
As it turns out, this was not the only irregularity that accompanied the acquisition by LT of what is now Allied Bank. Both PNB and the CB seem to have bent over backwards to ensure that LT got what he wanted. As documents obtained by Catalino Generillo from the CB indicate. Yes, the Generillo who was kicked out of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), at the behest of the solicitor general and LT, for doing his job too well.
There is a memorandum to the CB governor (Gregorio Licaros). Written on March 29, 1977, and signed by his top lieutenants--Senior Deputy Amado Brinas, Deputies Jimmy Laya and Gabby Singson, Special Assistant Carlota Valenzuela, Assistant Arnulfo Aurellano, and the director of the DCSB (something to do with bank supervision) Antonio Castro--the memo reveals the following:
1. The prospective bidders--Family Savings Bank (Gotianum), PB Communications (Go), Paramount Finance (Poblador), and the Lucio Tan Group (represented by Ramon Orosa)--were informed at a meeting on Saturday, March 26, that they must collateralize the emergency advances granted by the CB to GenBank with stand-by L/Cs issued by banks acceptable to the CB and "that the names of the banks that will issue said LCs must accompany the bids." It was only on Monday morning, March 28, that "the Governor instructed us to advise the prospective bidders that they should submit together with their bids, the firm commitment of the banks that will issue the stand-by letters of credit. However, we were able to contact only PB Communications and Paramount Finance who were advised accordingly."
Nota Bene: As of March 26, the requirement was only that the names of the banks who would be issuing the LCs were to accompany the bids. It was only on March 28 that the CB governor gave orders that firm commitments by (not just the names of) the issuing banks must accompany the bids. Yet, LT had already asked FM to twist the PNB’s arm on the 26th. He must have had advance information which even the CB deputy governors did not have. Given the sudden notice, the latter could contact only two of the prospective bidders, and LT wasn’t even one of them. Yet he was the only one able to submit that firm commitment, courtesy of PNB.
In fact, per the memo, LT was the only one who was able to submit a bid. How convenient.
2. The CB governor’s top lieutenants also "respectfully invited" his attention to the rule that "the total amount of the LC to be opened shall not exceed an amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of net worth." Well, the P310-million L/C issued by PNB was more than 18 percent of its net worth at the time (P1.7 billion). Laya et al. also pointed out that "the party who opened the stand-by L/C shall not have any past due obligation with the issuing bank for the 90-day period preceding the date of the issuance of the L/C." And that the stand-by LC shall be fully secured, with real estate mortgages and/or CB or national government bonds. Again, these requirements obviously were not met.
PNB broke so many CB rules in accommodating LT, at FM’s request. And the CB allowed it. Both not only bent backwards, they turned somersaults. Aside from the items detailed above, the Monetary Board (MB), on July 1, 1977 (Minutes No. 25), or after the expiration of the 90-day period within which to do so, deleted the requirement for PNB to issue the P310-million standby L/C. It also extended LT’s repayment period for those CB advances from two years to five years. And, instead of the required real estate and/or government and CB bonds as collateral, it chose to accept the tobacco leaf inventory of Fortune Tobacco.
Did LT manage to get CB and PNB to jump through the hoops on his own? If we are talking about today, the answer would be yes. The number of jurists, legislators and executives in his pocket is legend. But in 1977, LT was definitely not one of the big boys. He needed FM--and FM obliged. Even at the height (or depth) of our international debt crisis, when the government was scrounging around for foreign exchange reserves, FM obliged, directing the CB to deposit 50 million precious dollars in Allied Bank so it could pay its international creditors.
Because he loved LT? Or because he owned LT?
Friday
Civil Case 005: Calling A Spade
http://beta.bworldonline.com/main/content.php?id=901
Calling A Spade...
By Solita Collas-Monsod
Calling A Spade...
By Solita Collas-Monsod
Part 1
She says her husband owns 60% of the businesses. He says her husband does not. She proffers notarized deeds of assignment of shares of stock signed by him and his associates in favor of holding companies whose shares of stock are in turn assigned in blank (by the same parties), all of which are in her possession. He questions their authenticity.
"She" is Imelda Marcos, "he" is Lucio Tan (LT). They are co-defendants in Civil Case 005 in the Sandiganbayan, the charge of PCGG being that she and Ferdinand Marcos (FM), acting through their dummies, agents, and/or nominees in the persons of Lucio Tan et al. acquired beneficial ownership/interest in seven companies (including Asia Brewery, Fortune Tobacco, etc), "as well as the subsidiaries and companies which these operating ompanies have acquired or in turn invested in." And since the presumption is that the Marcos wealth is ill-gotten -- the Supreme Court having made judicial determination circa 2003 that the total lawful income of FM and Imelda from 1965 to 1986 amounted to P2,319.583.33 or $304,372.43 -- then obviously they must be made forfeit to the government.
The irony here is that Imelda, as mentioned above, has admitted such ownership, and in fact has filed a cross-complaint against her co-defendant LT, because, she claims, he refuses to turn over the relevant stock certificates despite her repeated demands for him to do so. She also claims that her husband’s acquisition of these properties was on the up and up (dispensing with all the legal verbiage).
The stakes are enormous: controlling interest -- 59%, to be accurate -- in the Lucio Tan group of companies, calculated by the PCGG in 1987 to be worth something in the neighborhood of P51 billion. To be sure, lawyers are not known for their numeracy, and I have yet to find out how they came up with that figure. But no matter how you cut that cake, the value of the equity, plus the accumulated (and uncollected) profits over the past 32 years, of that group of companies -- engaged in agriculture, construction, manufacturing (beer, tobacco), real estate development, and making additional corporate acquisitions -- would amount to, at the very least P100 billion by now. Lucio Tan is not reputed to be the second richest man in the Philippines (he used to be the richest, but either Henry Sy overtook him or is being more honest in his declarations) for nothing.
It is also no secret that Lucio Tan had no empire to speak of until Marcos came along. The question is whether the help that Marcos extended to LT’s businesses was impersonal/altruistic in nature -- in line with encouraging business in the Philippines -- or whether he had a vested, proprietary interest from the word go.
To shed light on that question, I offer for the reader’s delectation some documents supplied to me by Catalino Generillo, the lawyer who was kicked out from his job as special counsel to PCGG in Civil Case 005 because he committed the unforgivable crime (in the eyes of his bosses) of not only taking his work very seriously, but worse, looking like he might be successful.
The first document, reproduced below, reads as follows:
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
March 26, 1977
MEMORANDUM for --
His Excellency
The President
Re: General Bank & Trust Company
We were advised today by the Central Bank that not later than 7:00 P.M. on Monday, the 28th instant, sealed bids to purchase all the assets and assumes (sic) all the liabilities of General Bank & Trust Company shall be accepted and open (sic). Among the required conditions are:
1) All bids must include a letter of commitment from a bank acceptable to Central Bank to secure the advances of the latter in the amount of approximately P310 million by means of a standby letter of credit.
2) The winning bidder shall then be awarded a commercial banking license to operate.
For the first requirement, we felt that within a very limited span of time (until Monday, the 28th instant), such a condition is extremely difficult to comply (sic) except perhaps if given at least 90 days to do so. While we are confident we can raise the funds within 90 days, may we request your Excellency for your valuable assistance to persuade the PNB to issue the letter required by the Central Bank. On the other hand, we are submitting to PNB a proposal to guarantee their exposure under the letter commitment in which they are adequately protected.
As a result of this new development, we intend to offer only P300 million for the equity portion. In accordance to the last Memo which I received from Mr. Ramon Orosa on this basis, the purchase is now a reasonable package.
(Signed) LUCIO TAN
* * *
Notice that LTs request is humongous. He wants the President to order PNB to issue a a standby letter of credit worth P310 million, and he wants it done over the weekend (the letter was written on a Saturday). But notice also, that at the end, LT seems to be reporting to the President that he is going to offer "only" P300 million.
Do you think that LT would dare to ask the President to act unless he knew that the President had a pecuniary, proprietary interest in the outcome? Or that the President would act on such a request unless he indeed had such an interest? Otherwise, what would it matter to the President that LT was intending to offer "only" P300 million for the bank?
And look what happens next:
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
March 28, 1977
Central Bank of the Philippines Manila
Attention: Mr. Amado Brinas, Senior Deputy Governor
Gentlemen:
At the request of and for the account of Messrs. Lucio Tan and Willy Co, we are pleased to advise that within 90 days and upon receipt of the advice of the Central Bank, the Philippine National Bank is prepared to establish a Standby Letter of Credit in favor of the Central Bank under such terms and conditions that will be approved by the Board of Directors and which are acceptable to the Central Bank to secure the commitments of Messrs. Tan and Co in connection with their bid to purchase the General Bank and Trust Company, as follows:
Amount : P310,000,000.00
Interest : 12% per annum
Repayment : Quarterly as to principal and interest
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) P.O. DOMINGO
President
* * *
LT writes FM on a Saturday, and the PNB sends the required letter on Monday. Obviously FM made the call and gave the order. PNB wouldn’t go out on a limb like that, and with such a fast response time. Can you imagine PNB approving a P310 million loan on the same day that it was requested? And by the way, Catalino Generillo brought out a witness, a former senior vice president of the PNB, who testified that at the time, the single borrower’s limit was P200 million. So the PNB, in accommodating FM and LT not only acted with the speed of light, but also broke the law. What’s more , the Central Bank let them do it!
But even more is to come: After LT won the bid for GenBank (now Allied Bank), the Central Bank deleted the requirement for an issuance of a standby letter of credit and accepted mortgages instead. It also extended the payment period from two years to five years. How about that for an extremely soft landing for LT/FM?
(To be continued)
Monday
Overpowering Stench
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20091030-233173/Overpowering-stench
By Solita Collas-Monsod
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: October 30, 2009
AS ONE DELVES DEEPER AND DEEPER INTO Sandiganbayan Civil Case 005 against 28 individuals and 40 corporations (including the heirs of Ferdinand Marcos [FM] and Lucio Tan and his corporations), the stench—of corruption, of betrayal, name it—becomes almost overpowering.
Briefly, the case was filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987, charging among other things that Imelda Marcos and FM, acting through their dummies, agents, and/or nominees in the persons of Tan and other defendants, acquired beneficial ownership/interest in seven companies, namely (in alphabetical order) Asia Brewery, Dominion Realty and Construction, Foremost Farmers, Fortune Tobacco, Grandspan Development, Himmel Industries, and Silangan Holdings, and any subsidiaries and companies of these operating companies (presumably all of Tan’s business empire).
My understanding is that in her original answer sometime in 1991, Imelda did not deny that ownership, but averred that their acquisition of those corporations did not involve ill-gotten (unexplained) wealth. In any event, the case lay moldering as the plaintiffs amended the complaints, and the respondents answered and then amended their answers.
Then, in 2001, Imelda, in a document titled “Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Compulsory Cross Claim” brought the case to a new level: While still denying that any ill-gotten wealth was involved, she went into the details and extent of the Marcos holdings in the Tan companies.
To hear her tell it, FM had a 60-percent beneficial ownership in the above-mentioned companies, which interests were held in trust by Tan personally and through his family members and business associates who were recorded as stockholders of the companies.
Sometime in late 1980, ownership in these businesses were all consolidated in a holding company named Shareholdings Inc. with the stockholders of these companies exchanging their shares for shares in the holding company.
Shareholdings in turn, or rather its nominal stockholders—and this is how FM got his 60 percent, sometime in 1984—transferred/assigned their stocks to an ultimate set of holding companies: Basic Holdings, Supreme Holdings, and Falcon Holdings, with Basic getting 40 percent and Supreme and Falcon getting 60 percent. The nominal owners of the 60 percent of Shareholdings that went to Supreme and Falcon then executed and delivered to FM blank deeds of assignment.
Copies of these deeds of assignment were presented by Bongbong Marcos when he testified as a “hostile” witness at the Sandiganbayan.
Apparently, the reason why Imelda came out of the closet, as it were, and filed a cross-claim against Tan was that in spite of repeated demands from her, Tan never delivered the shares of stock to FM’s estate in accordance with the deeds of assignment. Who said there was honor among thieves?
But aside from those deeds of sale and assignment in Imelda’s possession (because the deeds of sale were notarized, copies were available at the National Archives—where Bongbong apparently got the certified copies), what other evidence was there to buttress her claim of ownership?
For that, one has only to look at the proprietary behavior on the part of FM in these companies—the amazingly short turn-around time between requests for FM’s intervention, and his action: would you believe one day? Three examples:
1. A letter, dated March 26, 1977 (a Saturday), from Tan to FM, regarding the purchase of General Bank and Trust Co (now Allied Bank). In it, Tan sends an SOS to FM, asking for his intervention in getting the PNB to issue a P310-million standby letter of credit in favor of the Central Bank (CB) as required by the latter. The bids for GenBank were to be opened the following Monday, and without that issuance, Tan would be disqualified. Aside from this request, Tan also mentioned how much his bid would be (whatever for, unless FM was part of it?). Result? On Monday, March 28, PNB president P.O. Domingo sent a letter to the CB signifying that PNB was prepared to issue the letter of credit in favor of the CB to secure Tan’s commitment. Action agad, right? How many bidders were disqualified for lack of that kind of backing? PNB’s single borrower limit at the time, by the way, was only P200 million.
2. A letter dated Jan. 11, 1982 from Asia Brewery to Trade Minister Bobby Ongpin, adverting to a letter written on Jan. 4 to FM which was endorsed to Ongpin, and which obviously Ongpin had not acted on. The letter to Ongpin had a marginal notation from FM, dated Jan. 12, addressed to CB Governor Jaime Laya and Customs Commissioner Ramon Farolan, to the effect that the request could be approved (exemption from duty and taxes for the importation of 60 million bottles).
3. A letter dated May 9, 1984 from Allied Bank (signed by Mariano Tanenglian and Romeo Co) to FM, asking that the Central Bank deposit $50 million with Allied Bank so that it could pay its Middle Eastern creditors. The marginal notation of FM was on May 10, addressed to CB Governor Jobo Fernandez—“I believe the proposal is acceptable.” This when the Philippines was in international debt crisis, and had hardly any dollar reserves. Marcos having proprietary interest in Tan’s companies? Is the Pope Catholic?
Please don’t tell me that that evidence is weak. Please don’t tell me that Tanenglian’s testimony would not have made the government’s case impregnable. The stakes? Sixty percent interest in the Tan empire. And yet the PCGG and the solicitor general are playing to lose.
By Solita Collas-Monsod
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: October 30, 2009
AS ONE DELVES DEEPER AND DEEPER INTO Sandiganbayan Civil Case 005 against 28 individuals and 40 corporations (including the heirs of Ferdinand Marcos [FM] and Lucio Tan and his corporations), the stench—of corruption, of betrayal, name it—becomes almost overpowering.
Briefly, the case was filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987, charging among other things that Imelda Marcos and FM, acting through their dummies, agents, and/or nominees in the persons of Tan and other defendants, acquired beneficial ownership/interest in seven companies, namely (in alphabetical order) Asia Brewery, Dominion Realty and Construction, Foremost Farmers, Fortune Tobacco, Grandspan Development, Himmel Industries, and Silangan Holdings, and any subsidiaries and companies of these operating companies (presumably all of Tan’s business empire).
My understanding is that in her original answer sometime in 1991, Imelda did not deny that ownership, but averred that their acquisition of those corporations did not involve ill-gotten (unexplained) wealth. In any event, the case lay moldering as the plaintiffs amended the complaints, and the respondents answered and then amended their answers.
Then, in 2001, Imelda, in a document titled “Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Compulsory Cross Claim” brought the case to a new level: While still denying that any ill-gotten wealth was involved, she went into the details and extent of the Marcos holdings in the Tan companies.
To hear her tell it, FM had a 60-percent beneficial ownership in the above-mentioned companies, which interests were held in trust by Tan personally and through his family members and business associates who were recorded as stockholders of the companies.
Sometime in late 1980, ownership in these businesses were all consolidated in a holding company named Shareholdings Inc. with the stockholders of these companies exchanging their shares for shares in the holding company.
Shareholdings in turn, or rather its nominal stockholders—and this is how FM got his 60 percent, sometime in 1984—transferred/assigned their stocks to an ultimate set of holding companies: Basic Holdings, Supreme Holdings, and Falcon Holdings, with Basic getting 40 percent and Supreme and Falcon getting 60 percent. The nominal owners of the 60 percent of Shareholdings that went to Supreme and Falcon then executed and delivered to FM blank deeds of assignment.
Copies of these deeds of assignment were presented by Bongbong Marcos when he testified as a “hostile” witness at the Sandiganbayan.
Apparently, the reason why Imelda came out of the closet, as it were, and filed a cross-claim against Tan was that in spite of repeated demands from her, Tan never delivered the shares of stock to FM’s estate in accordance with the deeds of assignment. Who said there was honor among thieves?
But aside from those deeds of sale and assignment in Imelda’s possession (because the deeds of sale were notarized, copies were available at the National Archives—where Bongbong apparently got the certified copies), what other evidence was there to buttress her claim of ownership?
For that, one has only to look at the proprietary behavior on the part of FM in these companies—the amazingly short turn-around time between requests for FM’s intervention, and his action: would you believe one day? Three examples:
1. A letter, dated March 26, 1977 (a Saturday), from Tan to FM, regarding the purchase of General Bank and Trust Co (now Allied Bank). In it, Tan sends an SOS to FM, asking for his intervention in getting the PNB to issue a P310-million standby letter of credit in favor of the Central Bank (CB) as required by the latter. The bids for GenBank were to be opened the following Monday, and without that issuance, Tan would be disqualified. Aside from this request, Tan also mentioned how much his bid would be (whatever for, unless FM was part of it?). Result? On Monday, March 28, PNB president P.O. Domingo sent a letter to the CB signifying that PNB was prepared to issue the letter of credit in favor of the CB to secure Tan’s commitment. Action agad, right? How many bidders were disqualified for lack of that kind of backing? PNB’s single borrower limit at the time, by the way, was only P200 million.
2. A letter dated Jan. 11, 1982 from Asia Brewery to Trade Minister Bobby Ongpin, adverting to a letter written on Jan. 4 to FM which was endorsed to Ongpin, and which obviously Ongpin had not acted on. The letter to Ongpin had a marginal notation from FM, dated Jan. 12, addressed to CB Governor Jaime Laya and Customs Commissioner Ramon Farolan, to the effect that the request could be approved (exemption from duty and taxes for the importation of 60 million bottles).
3. A letter dated May 9, 1984 from Allied Bank (signed by Mariano Tanenglian and Romeo Co) to FM, asking that the Central Bank deposit $50 million with Allied Bank so that it could pay its Middle Eastern creditors. The marginal notation of FM was on May 10, addressed to CB Governor Jobo Fernandez—“I believe the proposal is acceptable.” This when the Philippines was in international debt crisis, and had hardly any dollar reserves. Marcos having proprietary interest in Tan’s companies? Is the Pope Catholic?
Please don’t tell me that that evidence is weak. Please don’t tell me that Tanenglian’s testimony would not have made the government’s case impregnable. The stakes? Sixty percent interest in the Tan empire. And yet the PCGG and the solicitor general are playing to lose.
Striving to Lose
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20091024-231975/Striving-to-lose
By Solita Collas-MonsodPhilippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: October 24, 2009
MANILA, Philippines — I just watched for the first time a tape of Cheche Lazaro’s Aug. 15, 2007 “Probe” episode, featuring Civil Case 005 against Lucio Tan and the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. Speculation was rife at the time about a deal brewing between the Presidential Commission on Good Government and the Marcos heirs, fueled possibly by the fact that Catalino Generillo, then a special counsel of the PCGG, had subpoenaed Bongbong Marcos as a hostile witness in the case. That public speculation was baseless, as I have subsequently learned. It turns out that Generillo had a difficult time even getting the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General to approve the subpoena of Bongbong as a witness.
But let me not stray from the “Probe” episode. In it, Cheche showed interviews with PCGG head Camilo Sabio, with Generillo (who had been assigned the case since January 2007) and with former Sen. Jovito Salonga, the first head of the PCGG. What floored me was what Cheche said about Sabio: “’Nung tinanong ko sa kanya (Sabio) kung may ebidensiya, sabi niya na sinabi sa kanya ng mga dating abogado na humawak ng kaso ni Tan na walang ebidensiya ang gobyerno (When I asked him if there was evidence, he said that the former lawyers handling the case of Tan told him that the government had no evidence).”
Can you imagine, dear reader, the head of the government’s prosecution team in an ongoing P51-billion case (in 1987 pesos—this is the figure mentioned in the complaint), publicly admitting, for all to hear, including the defendants and the court, that the government had no evidence? And equally damning, can you imagine the one in charge of this important case virtually admitting that he knew nothing about it, but relied solely on the word of underlings? Does that sound like someone who has even the faintest desire to win?
No evidence? What rot. The PCGG had copies of the deeds of assignment and deeds of sale from Tan and his associates to companies (Shareholdings, Falcon, Supreme) that were owned by Marcos. But at the pretrial stage (it took almost 20 years for the case to reach trial), the defense apparently did not accept the authenticity of these documents because they were mere copies. And the PCGG left it at that—as did, apparently, the Sandiganbayan.
Until Generillo appeared on the scene and did a great deal of homework. For example, in 1998, Imelda Marcos had given a much-publicized interview to the Inquirer, in which she revealed that Ferdinand Marcos was the real owner, or a major stockholder of Tan’s companies. While Generillo’s predecessors may have not realized the value of that interview, Generillo, in going over the case files, did—and he used it as a basis for asking for the tape of the Inquirer interview, for copies of the reports based on that interview—and more importantly, for issuing a subpoena to Bongbong to shed light on the matter. The publicity surrounding that event was what led Cheche and her Probe Team to do those interviews.
I understand that when Bongbong did testify, he brought with him copies of those deeds of assignment and sale as supplied by his mother Imelda, in effect validating the PCGG documents. Why the pre-Generillo PCGG did not attempt to authenticate these documents in the imaginative way that Generillo did is anybody’s guess. Why did Bongbong give testimony that could be construed as damaging to the Marcoses? Because apparently, the Marcoses contend that the Marcos ownership of the Tan corporations is not because of unexplained wealth. But whatever the case may be, the fact is that his testimony certainly made the government case against Lucio Tan much stronger. And Generillo, as I previously wrote, was able to dig up documents from the archives, and from the Malacañang museum (such as the letters of Mariano Tanenglian to Marcos, asking for loans and exemptions), piling up a mountain of evidence.
Generillo remedied another PCGG omission and subpoenaed Salonga as a witness. What could Salonga’s contribution possibly have been? The “Probe” tape shows it: Salonga talked about how Lucio Tan, in the early days of the Aquino regime, offered a P500-million cash settlement for the case to be withdrawn (or not filed). President Corazon Aquino turned down the offer. Question: Why would Tan want to settle that large a sum if he was not guilty?
But the most glaring omission of the PCGG that Generillo caught and tried to remedy was that it totally ignored the admission of Imelda in her Amended Answer (to the complaint) that 60 percent of the Tan companies were owned by Marcos, with Tan as trustee. It also ignored the cross complaint filed by Imelda against Tan for the recovery of those shares. This, by the way, occurred way back in 2001.
Generillo was assigned to the case in January 2007. The next month, after reading the case files, he filed a motion in the Sandiganbayan for a summary judgment on the case. After all, what was there left to try, when the defendant admitted this crucial relationship? Alas, the Sandiganbayan turned it down. Undaunted, Generillo filed a motion for reconsideration—which after 20 months, has still not been decided. But I will leave the Sandiganbayan’s role in this sorry affair for a later time.
Generillo was getting too successful. He was fired. Tanenglian’s testimony would have been the final nail on the coffin of Tan’s assertion that Marcos had no share in his corporations. His offer to testify was turned down.
The whole thing stinks.
By Solita Collas-MonsodPhilippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: October 24, 2009
MANILA, Philippines — I just watched for the first time a tape of Cheche Lazaro’s Aug. 15, 2007 “Probe” episode, featuring Civil Case 005 against Lucio Tan and the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. Speculation was rife at the time about a deal brewing between the Presidential Commission on Good Government and the Marcos heirs, fueled possibly by the fact that Catalino Generillo, then a special counsel of the PCGG, had subpoenaed Bongbong Marcos as a hostile witness in the case. That public speculation was baseless, as I have subsequently learned. It turns out that Generillo had a difficult time even getting the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General to approve the subpoena of Bongbong as a witness.
But let me not stray from the “Probe” episode. In it, Cheche showed interviews with PCGG head Camilo Sabio, with Generillo (who had been assigned the case since January 2007) and with former Sen. Jovito Salonga, the first head of the PCGG. What floored me was what Cheche said about Sabio: “’Nung tinanong ko sa kanya (Sabio) kung may ebidensiya, sabi niya na sinabi sa kanya ng mga dating abogado na humawak ng kaso ni Tan na walang ebidensiya ang gobyerno (When I asked him if there was evidence, he said that the former lawyers handling the case of Tan told him that the government had no evidence).”
Can you imagine, dear reader, the head of the government’s prosecution team in an ongoing P51-billion case (in 1987 pesos—this is the figure mentioned in the complaint), publicly admitting, for all to hear, including the defendants and the court, that the government had no evidence? And equally damning, can you imagine the one in charge of this important case virtually admitting that he knew nothing about it, but relied solely on the word of underlings? Does that sound like someone who has even the faintest desire to win?
No evidence? What rot. The PCGG had copies of the deeds of assignment and deeds of sale from Tan and his associates to companies (Shareholdings, Falcon, Supreme) that were owned by Marcos. But at the pretrial stage (it took almost 20 years for the case to reach trial), the defense apparently did not accept the authenticity of these documents because they were mere copies. And the PCGG left it at that—as did, apparently, the Sandiganbayan.
Until Generillo appeared on the scene and did a great deal of homework. For example, in 1998, Imelda Marcos had given a much-publicized interview to the Inquirer, in which she revealed that Ferdinand Marcos was the real owner, or a major stockholder of Tan’s companies. While Generillo’s predecessors may have not realized the value of that interview, Generillo, in going over the case files, did—and he used it as a basis for asking for the tape of the Inquirer interview, for copies of the reports based on that interview—and more importantly, for issuing a subpoena to Bongbong to shed light on the matter. The publicity surrounding that event was what led Cheche and her Probe Team to do those interviews.
I understand that when Bongbong did testify, he brought with him copies of those deeds of assignment and sale as supplied by his mother Imelda, in effect validating the PCGG documents. Why the pre-Generillo PCGG did not attempt to authenticate these documents in the imaginative way that Generillo did is anybody’s guess. Why did Bongbong give testimony that could be construed as damaging to the Marcoses? Because apparently, the Marcoses contend that the Marcos ownership of the Tan corporations is not because of unexplained wealth. But whatever the case may be, the fact is that his testimony certainly made the government case against Lucio Tan much stronger. And Generillo, as I previously wrote, was able to dig up documents from the archives, and from the Malacañang museum (such as the letters of Mariano Tanenglian to Marcos, asking for loans and exemptions), piling up a mountain of evidence.
Generillo remedied another PCGG omission and subpoenaed Salonga as a witness. What could Salonga’s contribution possibly have been? The “Probe” tape shows it: Salonga talked about how Lucio Tan, in the early days of the Aquino regime, offered a P500-million cash settlement for the case to be withdrawn (or not filed). President Corazon Aquino turned down the offer. Question: Why would Tan want to settle that large a sum if he was not guilty?
But the most glaring omission of the PCGG that Generillo caught and tried to remedy was that it totally ignored the admission of Imelda in her Amended Answer (to the complaint) that 60 percent of the Tan companies were owned by Marcos, with Tan as trustee. It also ignored the cross complaint filed by Imelda against Tan for the recovery of those shares. This, by the way, occurred way back in 2001.
Generillo was assigned to the case in January 2007. The next month, after reading the case files, he filed a motion in the Sandiganbayan for a summary judgment on the case. After all, what was there left to try, when the defendant admitted this crucial relationship? Alas, the Sandiganbayan turned it down. Undaunted, Generillo filed a motion for reconsideration—which after 20 months, has still not been decided. But I will leave the Sandiganbayan’s role in this sorry affair for a later time.
Generillo was getting too successful. He was fired. Tanenglian’s testimony would have been the final nail on the coffin of Tan’s assertion that Marcos had no share in his corporations. His offer to testify was turned down.
The whole thing stinks.
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